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This paper centres on the material issues that underlie transformative challenges. We 
describe Japan’s Society 5.0 （cyber-space + physical space） industrial policy and the draft ６th 
Strategic Energy Plan. The former emphasizes inclusive resilience in developing and deploying 
advanced digitalization technology and the latter is aimed at decarbonization. Inclusiveness is 
embodied in a collaborative platform capitalism, aimed at maximizing public goods. 
Collaborative platforms are evident in multi-stakeholder SDGs cities, smart cities, local national 
resilience planning, and related initiatives.
At the same time, Japan’s Society 5.0 and energy strategies fall short in recognizing the 
imperative of integrating the emergent challenge of secure and environmentally sustainable 
supplies of critical raw materials, or critical minerals. This deficit in policymaking is surprising 
for a resource-poor country, and needs to be remedied.
Introduction
Japan’s Society 5.0 is both a scientific research and development initiative and an in-
dustrial-policy regime. It is aimed at melding digital technology and such critical infrastruc-
ture as energy, water, transport, health care, and other systems.1 ） It remains a somewhat 
amorphous concept in practice, but has provided an overarching scheme for industrial policy 
since the 201６-2020 Fifth Science and Technology Basic Plan. Japan evidently chose the “5.0” 
designation to distinguish its approach from the Germany’s Industry 4.0 initiative. Both seek 
to harness the digital and other smart technologies of the 4 th industrial revolution. But in-
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Society 5.0 : A People-centric Super-smart Society, Springer, 2020 : https://link.springer.com/
book/10.1007/978-981-15-2989- 4
立教経済学研究　第75巻　第 2 号　2021年2
centivized by disasters, demographics and other challenges, Japan’s effort transcends 
Germany’s smart factories and aims to deploy smart systems throughout the entire society, 
and hence it is designated “Society 5.0.”
As noted, the overall emphasis in Society 5.0 is to integrate cyber-space with physical 
space. In other words, it aims to link the Internet of Things, artificial intelligence, and other 
aspects of the ongoing digital transformation with the management of social and critical in-
frastructures. In practice, this integration sees sensing technology deployed on water, trans-
port, power and other networks so as to implement real-time monitoring and control. The 
aims include reducing the human and fiscal costs of maintenance, increasing disaster resil-
ience, and maximizing responsiveness to other societal needs. And since Japan’s digital com-
petitiveness ranking in 2020 was assessed at a low 27th internationally, Society 5.0 is also 
predicated on a nationwide rollout of the most advanced digital technologies. 
In Japan, smart technology is already used to integrate meteorological data from ad-
vanced radars to bolster resilience against the extreme weather that is part of climate 
change. These next-generation radars give rapid and pinpoint advance warning of impend-
ing rainfall. That situational awareness allows water managers to adjust dams, river flood 
control systems, sewerage systems and other critical infrastructures to cope with the hydro-
logical challenges posed by increasingly intense downpours. Tokyo’s sewerage division has 
already deployed this integration of technology. Tokyo uses advanced radar and monitoring 
technologies to manage its 1６,000 kilometers of pipes that in 2018 moved 4.６7 million cubic 
metres of waste-water per day through 84 massive pumping stations and 13 treatment cen-
tres.2 ） Further diffusion of these kinds of system-integration can be seen in monitoring for 
renewable energy systems, transport infrastructure, agriculture, and myriad other areas.
Hence Japan’s Society 5.0’s policy arms are broad-reaching. Prominent among its goals 
are digital transformation in smart cities, real-time disaster risk reduction, and precise mete-
orological monitoring for integrating variable renewable energy. Considerable fiscal invest-
ment is being targeted towards these objectives. In the 2021-2025 Sixth Science and 
Technology Basic Plan, total cumulative investment in Society 5.0 is expected to be JPY 30 
trillion. And total public and private investment in Society 5.0-related technologies is antici-
pated to reach JPY 120 trillion.3 ）
2 ）The data are available （in Japanese） in “Tokyo’s Sewerages, 2020,” Tokyo Metropolitan Govern-
ment, December, 2018: https://www.gesui.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/business/pdf/sewerageintokyo2020.pdf
3 ）See （in Japanese） “The Outline of the 5 -Year, JPY 30 Trillion Science and Technology Basic 
Plan,” Nihon Kogyo Shimbun, April ６ , 2021: https://newswitch.jp/p/2６703
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Inclusive Governance
Japan’s implementation of Society 5.0 is not a top-down initiative. Even before the 
shock of COVID-19, Japan featured increasing horizontal and vertical governance. For sever-
al years, Japan’s policy context has been framed by multi-level and multi-stakeholder indus-
trial policy that seeks to maximize the capacity to address such societal challenges as rapid 
ageing and depopulation in addition to the imperative of climate mitigation and adaptation. 
Japan’s Society 5.0 was also directly linked to disaster resilience and the other SDGs 
before COVID-19, and has become even more integrated since. One reason is that COVID-19 
lockdowns highlighted the importance of digital networks in tandem with the challenge of 
maintaining fiscally viable regional economies. Thus, Japan’s main business association, 
Keidanren, drafted a November 17, 2020 policy paper emphasizing the importance of “Society 
5.0 for SDGs” as key to building back better from COVID-19 .4 ） Similarly, Japan’s National 
Governor’s Association, reflecting a consensus among subnational governments, explicitly 
linked Society 5.0 and SDGs actions as critical transformative policies for a resilient recovery 
from COVID-19 . Even before the onset of COVID-19 , Japan’s multi-level action on SDGs 
was more robust than other developed countries, in encouraging Japanese subnational gov-
ernments to address domestic challenges as much as external engagement and global contri-
butions. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Japan’s SDGs collaboration deepened as a mecha-
nism for promoting a sustainable recovery. The Suga Administration’s September 2020 
commitment to net-zero decarbonization by 2050 saw Society 5.0 become nore closely fo-
cused on that ambition. For example, the Keidanren has released several reports on “Society 
5.0 with Carbon Neutral,” detailing the role of clean energy generation （renewables and nu-
clear），battery storage, and other technologies – together with smart monitoring and man-
agement – in reaching the decarbonization goals.5 ）
Japan’s collaborative context is seen in table 1 , which itemizes Japan’s broadly inclu-
sive Local SDGs Public-Private Collaborative Platform. The table lists the platform’s mem-
bers by category （eg., subnational governments） and then by the total members per catego-
ry. By the end of May, 2021, the platform’s membership included 907 of Japan’s prefectural 
4 ）See （in Japanese） the summary version at the following URL: https://www.keidanrensdgs.com/
society- 5 - 0 -jp
5 ）See （in Japanese） “Society 5.0 with Carbon Neutral,” Keidanren, December 15 , 2020 : https://
www.keidanren.or.jp/policy/2020/123.html
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and local governments in addition to most of the national government’s central agencies. In 
addition, civil society is very broadly represented by 4,503 business firms, research institu-
tions, NPOs and other organizations. The number of NPO/NGOs alone was 47６ , with a 
strong representation by social justice and local sustainability organizations. Importantly, the 
total membership of 5,423 more than quadrupled compared to the April 2020 total of 1,235 
members. This rapid increase in the platform’s total membership, in just ６  months, reflects 
the impact of COVID-19. ６） 7）
Another important vehicle for shaping Japan’s inclusive action is its Smart City 
Public-Private Collaborative Platform. The platform’s total organizational membership is 
itemized in table 2 . Of particular note is the growing number of local governments, 1６4 as 
of May 31, 2021. This platform is yet another venue via which Japan is implementing broad-
based Society 5.0 initiatives, with best practices shared among multiple stakeholders.
Yet another of Japan’s key collaborative governance platforms is National Resilience. 
6 ）See （in Japanese） “update of membership,” June 10 , 2021 : https://future-city.go.jp/platform/
member/
7 ）See （in Japanese） “Japan’s Smart City Public-Private Collaborative Platform”: https://www.mlit.
go.jp/scpf/about/index.html
Table 1 　 Japan’s Local SDGs Public-Private Collaborative Platform
Member Category Number of Members
Subnational Governments 907
Central Agencies 13
Private Firms and others 4,503
Total Membership （as of May, 2021） 5,423
Source: Future City, 2021 ６ ）
Table 2 　 Japan’s Smart City Public‐Private Collaborative Platform
Member Category Number of Members
Subnational Governments 1６4
Central Agencies 11
Businesses, Research Centres, and others 432
Business Associations 2
Total Membership （as of May 31, 2021） ６09
Source: MLIT, 2021 7 ）
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Japan’s National Resilience initiative dates back to 2014 and emphasizes all-hazard disaster 
preparation, building back better, and “whole of government” collaboration. Its ambit over-
laps with the platforms discussed above, in that it encompasses smart communications, sus-
tainable energy systems, resilient water networks, and the other critical infrastructures. 
Moreover, the impact of COVID-19 has also accelerated its diffusion among subnational gov-
ernments. By December of 2020, all of Japan’s 47 prefectures had adopted their own regional 
versions of the National Resilience Planning （NRP）．As we see in table 3 , as of August 1 , 
2021, fully 1,733 of Japan’s 1,741 cities, special wards, and towns had either adopted their own 
local versions of the NRP or were formulating plans. That number of local governments do-
ing NRPs was more eight times the 203 total in July of 2019.8 ） 
Japanese policymaking thus emphasizes several types of inclusiveness. Governance is 
adapting to climate and other cascading hazard risks that outstrip the capacity of segmented 
agency, policy, and critical infrastructure to respond effectively. Japan thus offers a lesson on 
how to expand disaster-risk reduction to include bolstering both the resilience of the social 
sphere and the built environment in the face of interconnected climate, seismic, demographic, 
economic, health, and other hazards. 
The Draft Strategic Energy Plan
On July 21 of 2021 Japanese policymakers unveiled a draft version of the country’s 
６th Strategic Energy Plan.9 ） Much like previous iterations of the triennial planning initiative, 
the goals are both comprehensive and controversial. Unlike previous versions, this draft’s 
ambitions are crafted as much to address international decarbonization commitments as to 
appease domestic advocacy coalitions. This section discusses the most pertinent details of 
the draft, which as of this writing remain a focus of media attention and public debate. We 
8 ）See （in Japanese） “Map of Adopted Local National Resilience Plans”: https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/
seisaku/kokudo_kyoujinka/pdf/210801_keikakumap.pdf
9 ）The draft of the ６th Strategic Energy Plan is available （in Japanese） at the following URL: 
https://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/committee/council/basic_policy_subcommittee/opinion/data/01.pdf
Table 3 　 Japan’s Local National Resilience Plans （NRPs）
Administrative Level July 1, 2019 August 1, 2021
Local Government 203 1,733
Source: National Resilience, 2021 8 ）
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address the power-sector targets, including renewables and nuclear, but move beyond those 
items in keeping with the ongoing evolution of the Japanese specialist and public debate.
Introduction
Japan’s strategic energy plans cover the power sector in addition to the larger energy 
economy. The plans aggregate what is deemed to be the best-available evidence on current 
and mid-term energy costs, strategic options, and myriad other parameters relevant to shap-
ing policy for a resource-poor industrial economy with the world’s 4 th largest appetite for 
energy. The current draft, released on July 21 , is subject to public comment through 
September of 2021. It is not expected to be formally adopted by the cabinet until after a gen-
eral election that must be held by October 22 of the same year. As of this writing, Japan’s 
Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide is slated to resign his post at the end of September 2021 and 
be replaced by a newly elected LDP President. Hence, the strategic energy plan’s details 
may change and this analysis is therefore tentative.
The present draft was developed through a more inclusive process than earlier plans. 
The consultation process for building earlier plans tended to be centred within the ambit of 
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry （METI），technocratic deliberation councils, 
and major business associations. This time, deliberation extended well beyond METI to in-
clude other ministries, notably the Ministry of the Environment （MoE）．The assessment of 
energy costs and economic opportunities was also more wide-ranging than in the past. 
Policies to accelerate smart electrification for decarbonization and disaster resilience were 
ramped up. And the overall initiative was framed by Prime Minister Suga’s commitment to a 
4６% reduction of Japan’s greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 and net-zero by 2050. 
The Key Goals
Proposed changes to the previous plan’s vision of Japan’s 2030 power mix have re-
ceived the most attention domestically and internationally. Table 4  compares the two plans’ 
essential details. The 2018 5th plan rather grudgingly conceded to making solar, wind, bio-
mass and other renewables 20-22% of the power mix. But the accelerating global diffusion of 
ever-cheapening solar, wind and storage helped encourage raising the renewable target to 
3６-38%, which by 2020 was already roughly 18% of Japan’s power mix. Also attracting much 
commentary was the decision to maintain the ambition for nuclear power to compose 20-
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22% of electricity generation, building on the current level of roughly ６ %. Added to the 
draft’s aims for decarbonizing renewable and nuclear are an explicit commitment to about 
1 % of power generation via burning hydrogen and/or ammonia. This first-ever explicitly 
quantified commitment to previous plans’ visions for a “hydrogen society” is expected to help 
boost the zero-carbon share of the power mix to 59%, compared to the aim of 44% in the 
2018 plan. 10）
The big losers in the draft are fossil-fuel thermal generation, including liquid natural 
gas （LNG），coal, and oil-fired power. In 2019, these sources composed 7６% of Japan’s power 
mix, their respective shares being 37% （LNG），32% （coal），and 7 % （oil）．LNG is thus 
projected to drop to 20% by 2030, a far steeper cut than the previous scenario of it declining 
to 27%. Though coal-fired generation is about twice as dirty than LNG, its rate of decline is 
less precipitous, down to 19% versus the 2６% envisioned in the 5th plan. Projected changes to 
the role of oil-fired power is minimal with a projected 3 % share falling to 2 %. The draft 
plan would therefore have fossil-fueled power totaling 41% of the power mix by 2030, down 
from a 5６% share envisioned in the 5th energy plan. 
One item not adequately addressed in the continuing debate over Japan’s draft plan is 
its great ambition for energy efficiency. The ６th plan anticipates Japan’s power needs to de-
cline to about 930-940 billion kWh, compared to 2019’s level of 1,024 billion kWh. The 5th plan, 
by contrast, expected Japan’s power demand to increase to 1,0６5 billion kWh. 
10）The figures are available （in Japanese） in the draft ６th Strategic Energy plan at the following 
URL: https://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/committee/council/basic_policy_subcommittee/opinion/
data/01.pdf
Table 4 　 Comparing Japan’s Proposed 2030 Power Mixes （Units: %）
2018 5th Basic Energy Plan 2021 ６th Basic Energy Plan （Draft）
Renewable 22-24 Renewable 3６-38
Nuclear 20-22 Nuclear 20-22
Hydrogen-Ammonia 0 Hydrogen-Ammonia 1
LNG 27 LNG 20
Coal 2６ Coal 19






Source: METI, 2021 10）
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Key Issues
Japan’s proposed revisions have been positively assessed by some observers, particu-
larly internationally where there is strong desire to keep decarbonization at the core of the 
too-easily distracted global agenda. Yet the new goals have attracted an unprecedented deal 
of concern in the domestic debate. We shall address these in turn.
Renewables
Criticism of the renewable targets includes disappointment that they are not much 
higher and – somewhat contrarily - worry that they are unrealistically ambitious. Those who 
advocate for higher renewable numbers insist that the declining international cost of solar 
and wind present Japan with an opportunity to take back the leadership role it enjoyed de-
cades ago. They insist that the opportunities to build robust domestic renewable industries – 
especially in offshore wind, hydrogen, and smart-energy management – could help the coun-
try play a stronger role in global greening. Many of these advocates argue that the draft 
plan should target well over 40% renewables by 2030 , maintaining that this would lead to 
lower power costs by 2030.
These advocates compose a Japanese-style Green New Deal （GND），or Green Re- 
covery camp, comparable to those in the EU and the US. As we shall see in greater detail 
below, whether in Japan or elsewhere their ambitious assertions concerning renewable ener-
gy generally ignore critical minerals. As renowned ecological economist William Rees argues 
in a July 2021 expert collaboration with America’s The Real Green New Deal Project’s 
Executive Director:
“GND proponents are appallingly tolerant of the inexplicable. They fail to address 
how the gigatons of already severely depleted metals and minerals essential to building 
so-called RE technologies will be available in perpetuity considering typical five to 30-year 
life spans and the need for continuous replacement. They offer no viable workarounds for 
the ecological damage and deplorable working conditions, often in the Global South, in-
volved in metal ore extraction. Green New Dealers advance no viable solutions （technical 
or financial） for electrifying the many high-heat-intensive manufacturing processes in-
volved in constructing high-tech wind turbines and solar panels （not to mention all other 
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products in modern society）．The waste streams generated by so-called renewables at 
the end of their short working lives are either ignored or assumed away, to be dealt with 
eventually by yet non-existent recycling processes. Proposals for electrifying the 80% of 
non-electrical energy demand overlook crucial facts, namely that the national-scale trans-
mission systems and grids required for electrified land transportation do not even exist to-
day, nor is the needed build-out likely given material, energy, and financial constraints.”11）
Rees and his colleague’s arguments are very critical, but are based on some of the 
best available literature on critical minerals. Rees is also a founding member and past-Presi-
dent of the Canadian Society for Ecological Economics. He is also a co-creator of the concept 
of the “ecological footprint,” which now informs environmental policymaking in many coun-
tries and academic studies. In short, the above arguments are backed up by evidence and 
from an authoritative source. The arguments also show how awareness of critical mineral is-
sues is diffusing in Canada and the US, notwithstanding their massive endowments. So it 
makes Japanese silence seem all the more surprising, since the country has virtually no sig-
nificant terrestrial endowments.
Naturally enough, Japan’s dwindling band of critics of renewable energy assert that 
the raised renewable targets can only be met with expensive （in Japan） solar and wind, and 
thus increase energy poverty while undermining the country’s competitiveness. But concerns 
about renewables are not restricted to these stalwart critics. During the first half of 2021 , 
Japan’s centre-left media – such as the Asahi Newspaper – began to emphasize the pecuniary 
and environmental costs of renewables. Their attention was directed particularly at the utili-
ty-scale solar that would presumably comprise the bulk of renewable deployments up to 
2030 （since offshore wind is as yet a nascent industry）．Indeed, on July 18 Japan’s trusted 
national broadcaster NHK released a survey that revealed roughly 10% of Japan’s 500 kW+ 
solar arrays were in areas of significant landslide risk.12） The NHK’s work increased the 
spotlight on a large risk-governance gap, where lax rules leave local communities vulnerable 
to worsened disaster risks in the name of greening. Attention to this kind of issue has also 
mushroomed because local governments have been increasingly compelled to implement lo-
11）Megan Seibert and William Rees, “Through the Eye of a Needle: An Eco-Heterodox Perspective 
on the Renewable Energy Transition,” Energies, 14 （15），July 2６ , 2021 : https://www.mdpi.com/ 
199６-1073/14/15/4508/htm
12）See （in Japanese） “Research on siting of solar projects: Over 1,100 areas confront landslide risks,” 
NHK News, July 18, 2021: https://www 3 .nhk.or.jp/news/html/20210718/k100131451６1000.html
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cal ordinances, as residents band together and oppose projects they deem to unduly impact 
local environmental amenities.13）
These issues are by no means peculiar to Japan. Bloomberg New Energy Finance has 
warned that pushback against renewable projects could see Germany’s spare power capacity 
plunge to 3 % by 2023 （due to the impending nuclear shutdown in 2022） from 2６% before 
the pandemic. That level of capacity means blackouts during peaks in winter and summer, 
plus higher power prices for emergency purchases. And German power prices are already 
highest in the EU. Bloomberg points out that:
“For a long time, Germany showed the world how renewable energy could be added 
to make up a substantial share of the power mix. Now, the Norwegian utility Statkraft SF 
says it takes twice as long to build a wind park in Germany compared with the U.S. 
Complaints from locals, a lack of space, stricter environmental standards and a longer per-
mitting process are just some of the reasons growth is slowing.” 14）
Added to the Japanese and German cases, Switzerland also presents a challenge. The 
Swiss government plans to shut down the country’s 3  nuclear reactors over the next de-
cade, eliminating approximately one-third of power generation capacity. But variable renew-
able energy seems inadequate to make up for nuclear, as in 2020 “Switzerland produced just 
311 kWh of energy per resident from solar and wind power, according to the Swiss Energy 
Foundation, a renewable energy think-tank. By comparison, Denmark produced 3,027 kWh, 
Germany 2,232 kWh and the UK 1,304 kWh.” Moreover, building just one large-scale turbine 
project – the Windpark Gotthardpass that went on-line in October of 2020 – took an aston-
ishing 18 years of negotiations with local communities.15）
Moreover, related debate on the Japanese energy draft’s details warn about the trans-
mission, storage and other system costs of solar and other intermittent renewables, including 
the need for back-up by thermal power. The draft plan and related work has yet to calculate 
13） One of the best available summaries of these issues is found （in Japanese） in Kohno Hiroko, “Solar 
panels and landslides: moving towards solutions,” Toyo Keizai Online, July 10 , 2021 : https://
toyokeizai.net/articles/-/440093
14） Vanessa Dezem, “Germany Flirts With Power Crunch in Nuclear and Coal Exit,” Bloomberg 
News, August 22 , 2021 : https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-22/germany-flirts-
with-power-crunch-in-nuclear-and-coal-exit
15） See Sam Jones, “Alpine nimbyism freezes Swiss green energy dreams,” Financial Times, July 5 , 
2021: https://www.ft.com/content/0６2ae877-６６c8-4782-8838-3a57b3873a1b
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these costs in specific terms for Japan. But they are likely to be significant. Infrastructure 
projects tend to be costly in Japan, and unlike the EU countries Japan lacks the international 
power-trading that helps balance intermittency.
Nuclear
The decision to maintain the aim of securing about 20% nuclear in the 2030 power 
mix also satisfied no one. Since the 3 -11 nuclear and natural disaster at Fukushima, 
Japanese public opinion has generally remained cool towards restarting extant nuclear capac-
ity, let alone building more. So advocates of 100% renewables fought to have nuclear elimi-
nated from the 2030 mix, whereas advocates of keeping or increasing nuclear were handi-
capped by memories of 3 -11 coupled with continuing safety and other slip-ups by the 
industry. 
Critics of nuclear power largely base their case on costs and public opinion. They ar-
gue that costs have increased with the expanding burden of safety measures, the legacy of 
3 -11, and the difficulties of decommissioning. These facts are undeniable, as is the stubborn-
ly negative data on public opinion. Critics also emphasize a narrative that nuclear has no fu-
ture, drawing heavily on debates from within the EU. 
In formulating the current draft, the anti-nuclear position was bolstered by several 
factors. Most importantly, the impending general election and PM Suga’s abysmal rankings 
in the polls put a premium on political risk reduction. Another is an increasing split within 
the governing Liberal Democrat Party （LDP） on nuclear, with the MoE Minister Koizumi 
Junichiro openly advocating its reduction in alliance with other LDPers and the LDP coali-
tion Komei Party. These factors worked together to enable the anti-nuclear advocates to se-
cure removal from this draft of any commitments to new nuclear construction. It remains to 
be seen if this and other wording is changed after the election.
Advocates of nuclear power also base their case on costs, in addition to the imperative 
of decarbonization. They concede that costs have increased, but also note that Japan’s recent 
permitting of over 40-year lifetimes for extant plant implies reduced costs over their extend-
ed lifecycles. They also highlight nuclear’s provision of baseload power to complement inter-
mittent wind and solar, indicating that their perspective has evolved considerably from a de-
cade ago when they derided renewables as marginal. In addition, they note that the 
reassessment of nuclear costs still keeps the technology cheaper than most fossil in the pres-
ent and foreseeable future. And they emphasize that restarting Japan’s roughly 30 viable re-
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actors is the fastest and cheapest way to secure significant cuts in greenhouse gas.
Yet observers point out that without accelerated progress on reactor restarts, Japan 
seems unlikely to reach the draft plan’s 20-22% target for 2030. They also underscore a dis-
turbing lack of investment in training new nuclear engineers and other human resources, 
critical in a demographic context where lumpy retirements are impending.
Interestingly, potentially one of the most important interventions in Japan’s public de-
bate on nuclear came on June 28 from International Energy Agency （IEA） Executive 
Director Fatih Birol. Birol noted in a Japanese article that Japan’s topographic and other 
challenges essentially required that nuclear restarts and new build complement renewables 
and efficiency. Birol argued – in English on the IEA website – that “if Japan relied on solar 
PV and batteries instead, an additional land area equivalent to 12 times the entire Tokyo 
metropolitan region would need to be covered by solar panels, and storage capacity equiva-
lent to 40 times the world’s current largest battery project would need to be built.” 1６）
Birol is one of the world’s most respected and pragmatic voices on the imperative of 
accelerated decarbonization and the enormous structural challenges it represents. He is also 
adamant that all decarbonizing technologies （existing and under development） are essential, 
a sharp contrast to advocacy coalitions that emphasize preferred technologies – such as solar 
and wind renewable energy – at the expense of nuclear power, hydropower, carbon capture, 
and other technologies. Birol has repeatedly insisted that empirical reality must precede ide-
alism.
One indicator that Birol’s argument vis-à-vis Japan is persuasive comes from Japan’s 
nearest neighbour, South Korea. South Koreans elected current President Moon Jae-in 
（Democratic Party） on May 10, 2017, among whose major policy planks were eliminating the 
role of nuclear energy. But more recently, the Moon Administration’s stance on nuclear has 
changed considerably, and for many of the same reasons that Birol highlights in the Japanese 
context. Japan Nikkei Asia newspaper summarized these facts in a September 2 , 2021 arti-
cle on Moon’s abrupt shifts on nuclear power:
“Moon won the presidency in 2017 in part by campaigning against nuclear power. 
Once in office, Moon said he would scrap plans to build nuclear plants and forbid aging fa-
16）Fatih Birol, “Japan will have to tread a unique pathway to net zero, but it can get there through 
innovation and investment,” International Energy Agency, June 28, 2021: https://www.iea.org/com 
mentaries/japan-will-have-to-tread-a-unique-pathway-to-net-zero-but-it-can-get-there-
through-innovation-and-investment
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cilities from prolonging operation.
But he backed away from those declarations after experts argued against the 
planned cancellations of plant projects already under construction. The administration also 
restarted plants that were suspended for inspections after businesses and consumers com-
plained of tight power supplies and rate hikes.
South Korea’s nuclear plants operated at ６7% of capacity in 2018 from over 80% pri-
or to Moon’s inauguration in 2017. But the figure returned to 75% as of 2020.
Driving the government’s support for SMR research is the stated goal of attaining 
net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by mid-century.
‘We will have to make nuclear power a key source of energy for the next ６0 years,’ 
Kim said in a parliamentary debate in June.
Nuclear power accounted for 18.2% of South Korea’s energy mix last year, the 
third-largest category after liquefied natural gas at 32.3% and coal at 28.1%. Megasolar 
farms are unworkable because South Korea contains little flatland.” 17）
Thermal
Among environmental and renewable advocacy coalitions, Japan’s ambition to reduce 
thermal to 41% of the power mix was rapidly declared inadequate in light of accelerating cli-
mate change. Certainly there is no denying that, in light of ongoing climate impacts and dis-
turbing revelations on the proximity of various climate tipping points. On the other hand, 
Japan’s thermal targets have also been called into question by the challenges confronting the 
renewable and nuclear keys to decarbonization.
Japan’s aim of reducing coal to 19% from the current 32% of the mix has received 
faint applause. North American and European/UK coal power is in steep decline, often to 
single digits, and the perception is that Japan should be in a similar position. Yet Japan’s coal 
fleet is younger than its counterparts among the G7, and it lacks the continental power-trad-
ing or cheap natural gas that have enabled the EU and the US to drive a lot of coal from 
their power mixes. Indeed, the METI experts insist that reducing coal to 19% of Japan’s 
power mix was the limit of the possible, in light of costs, reliability, energy security, and oth-
er pertinent aspects.
17）See Kotaro Hosokawa, “Small is beautiful in South Korea’s pivot back to nuclear power,” Nikkei 
Asia, September 2 , 2021: https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Energy/Small-is-beautiful-in-South-Ko 
rea-s-pivot-back-to-nuclear-power
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The aim of nearly halving the role of LNG from 37% currently to 20% by 2030 mainly 
caught the attention of experts concerned about the signaling effects. They are concerned 
that LNG （and to some extent coal） exporters might take the numbers seriously and be in-
centivized to reduce their reliance on Japan in favour of other consuming countries. It is 
worried that the fallout could be reduced energy security and higher prices. 
Interestingly, some of Japan’s most ambitious renewable scenarios actually rely on the 
power mix being roughly half of LNG in 2030 in order to chase out coal and nuclear. Those 
scenarios are perhaps the most telling evidence that – at least in energy - there is a limit on 
the number of big things that can be done in a decade. As we have seen earlier, Japan lacks 
the cross-border power trading, ample usable land, and other low-cost endowments that ad-
vantage its counterparts among the advanced countries.
In short, Japan’s draft energy plan is inadequate for actually achieving the decarbon-
ization targets while maintaining economic vitality, environmental justice, and other ameni-
ties. In the face of constrained material, fiscal, human and other resources – not to mention 
time - some compromises seem imperative. But those compromises should not include sacri-
ficing the decarbonization goals. 
The Critical Mineral Challenge
We have seen that Japan’s rollout of Society 5.0 is well-funded and proceeds via inclu-
sive governance. Japan’s energy policy update is less impressive, but does attempt to shift 
towards greater sustainability and decarbonization. However, one prominent issue that 
Japan’s digital and energy policy regimes overlook is the role of copper, cobalt, rare earths 
and other critical minerals required to integrate cyber and physical space and build renew-
ables, electric cars, and stationary battery storage. All digital and renewable technologies re-
quire significant volumes of critical minerals in order to achieve high levels of functionality. 
Similarly, the digital modernization of physical infrastructures in energy, health, sanitation, 
and other areas also implies extensive use of critical minerals, in contrast to conventional 
networks. 
Recent European work on the material-intensiveness of digital transformation and re-
newables makes this clear. The Green Europe Foundation started work on these issues in 
April of 2021 because it was concerned about the demand for critical minerals implied by 
European Union （EU） planning. They write:
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“According to the European Commission, by 2030 , the European Union （EU） will 
need up to 18 times more lithium and 5  times more cobalt than its total current consump-
tion, to cover electric car batteries and energy storage alone. By 2050, this is forecast to 
increase to almost ６0 times more lithium and 15 times more cobalt. 
Alongside the energy transition, the digital transition is a priority for the EU. It also 
relies on metals. Many digital innovations enhance our quality of life. Teleworking and vid-
eoconferencing have proven particularly useful during the coronavirus pandemic. Sensors, 
data, and algorithms allow a more sustainable use of resources, including energy and mate-
rials. But, in turn, all digital technologies require energy and materials. Despite the ethere-
al metaphor of ’the cloud,’ the data economy has a heavy material footprint, which includes 
a wide array of metals. Gains in the energy and material efficiency of devices and net-
works are outpaced by the exponential growth of data, which doubles every two to three 
years.
The cleantech and digital sectors are competing for the same metals. European de-
mand for rare earths, which are used in electric cars and wind turbines but also in digital 
devices, could rise tenfold by 2050.” 18）
Though the EU population of 44６ million is large, it is only about ６ % of the global 
population of well over 7  billion people. That means the EU demand for critical minerals 
would potentially exhaust global supplies unless major trade-offs were made in digital and 
decarbonization.
The best overview of the energy and mobility aspects of these issues is provided by 
the May 5 , 2021 International Energy Agency （IEA） report on The Role of Critical 
Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions （hereafter, Critical Minerals）．19） Critical Minerals was 
produced in tandem with many other increasingly worrisome studies on mineral demand for 
digital technology and decarbonization. The report follows a decade of EU-funded scoping 
and other research that assess global demand across power, mobility, communications, health 
tech, military, space, and other categories. To quote an editorial in the April, 2021 edition of 
the academic journal Materials, “The indisputable conclusion after about 10 years of finalized 
18） See “Metals for a Green and Digital Europe,” Green Europe Foundation, April 21, 2021: https://
www.wetenschappelijkbureaugroenlinks.nl/metals-for-europe
19） The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 is accessible at the following URL: https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of- 
critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions
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CRM [critical raw materials] projects research is that the most advanced technologies re-
quired for the green and digital transition will lead to a drastic increase in demand.” 20） 21）
Detailed quantification of this material-intensity in electrified transport – a core goal 
of Japan’s Society 5.0 and energy strategy - is seen in figure 1 , which compares the critical 
mineral density for electric vehicles and clean power generation. The top section （“trans-
port”） in the figure shows that an electric vehicle is dramatically more material-intensive 
than a conventional car. Electrifyying the vehicle means it will not directly require gasoline 
or diesel fuel. But in place of those fossil fuels, electrification requires much more copper per 
vehicle, but also significant quantities of lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite, and rare earths. 
Overall, an electric vehicle is 5  to ６  times as mineral-intensive than a conventional vehicle.
Similarly, figure 1  demonstrates that clean power generation technologies – another 
core goal of Society 5.0 and the energy strategy - have significantly higher material-density, 
expressed as kilogrammes/megawatt （kg/MW） of generation capacity. Carbon-intensive 
natural gas and coal-fired generation require only moderate amounts of copper, nickel and 
other materials for the pipes and other infrastructure that compose their plant. By compari-
20） See Girtan, Mihaela, et al. “The Critical Raw Materials Issue between Scarcity, Supply Risk, and 
Unique Properties,” Materials, April, 2021 : https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC 
80６7847/
21）The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions
Notes: kg = kilogramme; MW = megawatt. Steel and aluminium not included. See Chapter 1  and Annex for details 
on the assumptions and methodologies. 
Source: IEA, 202121）
Figure 1 　 Minerals used in selected clean energy technologies
IEA. All rights reserved.
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son, a nuclear plant has, per MW, more than double the material footprint of coal and triple 
that of natural gas, with an especially heavy reliance on chromium. But solar and wind gen-
eration have even heavier reliance on such base metals as copper in addition to rare earths 
for offshore wind and silicon for solar. Moreover, the aggregate per-MW amount of critical 
minerals balloons from a couple of metric tons for a natural gas plant to nearly 1６ tons for 
offshore wind. Since wind and solar have considerably lower capacity factors – meaning per-
cent of actual power generation versus rated generation capacity – than fossil-fuel and nu-
clear plant, their total volume of critical minerals required to produce a given amount of 
power is even higher than expressed in the figure.
Additionally, the IEA data suggest that distributed energy systems may need rethink-
ing. Japan’s Society 5.0 vision and energy strategy are in part predicated on smart, distribut-
ed energy networks as the core infrastructure of smart cities. But the more distributed the 
power generation the higher the material-intensity: “Distributed solar PV systems tend to 
have string inverters or microinverters, requiring about 40% more copper than utility-scale 
projects, which typically use central inverters. Other mineral intensities are similar between 
utility-scale and distributed applications.” 22）
This above point is of particular relevance to Japan. Because of the pushback against 
large-scale solar, many of Japan’s renewable energy advocates emphasize distributed solar 
generation. But there is as yet no debate on the increased material-intensity of this distribut-
ed strategy.
Figure 2  offers more data on key mineral demand for solar power. It enumerates the 
2020 demand, in kilotons （kt），for copper, silicon and silver in global solar deployments. The 
figure then assesses the likely increased demand according to two scenarios: the Stated 
Policies Scenario （STEPS），which currently implies global warming of over 3  degrees 
Celsuis, and Sustainable Development Scenario （SDS），which aims to limits global warming 
to well below 2  degrees Celsius, and ideally to 1.5 degrees. STEPS and SDS are used 
throughout the report. The SDS and STEPS scenarios for solar vary greatly for the years 
2030 and 2040. Copper demand more than doubles in SDS 2040, compared to 2020. Silicon, in 
turn, doubles, by SDS 2040, but then levels off through technological change and recycling. 
Silver in fact declines in the SDS scenario for 2040 compared to a large increase in SDS 2030.
The IEA concludes that the aggregate demand for the 30-odd critical minerals used 
22）See p. 5６ , The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable 
Energy Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean- 
energy-transitions
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in clean-energy technologies may increase by six-fold or more. Within that increase, depend-
ing on the 11 technological pathways used by Critical Minerals, individual materials confront 
varying demand profiles. For example, in utility scale storage under the SDS, between 2020 
and 2040 nickel demand is projected to grow 140 times, cobalt by 70 times, and manganese 
by 58 times. 23）
In theory, the prospect of such massive demand increases should see market mecha-
nisms induce much more investment in critical-mineral mining, greater efficiency, and substi-
tution. The IEA experts do not deny that markets play a powerful role, but they caution that 
they are “typically accompanied by price volatility, considerable times lags or some loss of 
performance or efficiency.” 24） Later in this paper, we see that these developments are indeed 
occurring.
The overall message is that critical mineral constraints could increase the cost of 
Society 5.0 digitalization and decarbonization while also slowing its pace and reducing its 
depth in difficult areas. 
23）The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable Energy 
Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-
transitions
24）See p. 117, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable 
Energy Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean- 
energy-transitions
Note: kt = thousand tonnes. 
Source: IEA, 2021 23）
Figure 2 　 Demand for copper, silicon and silver for solar PV by scenario


























2020 2030 2040 2030 2040
STEPS SDS
Silver
Critical Minerals and the Digital Decarbonization Challenge 19
Mining Lead Times
Increased investment in mining critical minerals is not simply a matter of throwing 
more money at producers. One major problem in this respect is the very long lead times for 
mining projects. Critical Minerals reveals that, between 2010-2019, the global average lead 
time – from discovery to production - for the world’s top 35 critical minerals mining projects 
was well over 15 years. The fastest average projects the IEA team identify in their report 
was 4  years for mining lithium in Australia. But finding and developing nickel and copper 
mines take well over a decade, and often closer to 2  decades. Even halving these lead times 
would do little to address the demand gaps opening up in the present.
The IEA’s analyses of projects in the pipeline also suggests that this concentration is 
very unlikely to change much, at least over the next 5  to 10 years, even though many of the 
production sites have poor performance on governance, human rights, and other indicators. 
That means the complication of long lead times is compounded by ESG challenges. To be 
sure, the severe human rights concerns surrounding cobalt – 70% of which is mined in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo – have led to efforts to substitute for it. But these efforts 
have not been successful in the aggregate. The IEA therefore anticipates demand for cobalt 
to increase 21 times between 2020 and 2040, under an SDS scenario.
The IEA also warns that processing of critical minerals is also geographically concen-
trated, especially in China, something we shall examine in detail in a subsequent section. The 
very high volatility of demand, the environmental costs of refining, and other drivers underlie 
this concentration. In short, China is better able to bear environmental costs and build robust 
policies that dampen the disincentive effects of volatility. Among countries dependent on 
China, especially the US and the EU, there is significant talk of more domestic mining and 
relocating processing and related supply chains. But the evidence suggests it is a lot easier 
to talk about doing those things than actually get them done. Among the many hurdles, busi-
ness incentives are not adequate. And most environmentalists oppose reshoring critical min-
eral mining and refining, even as they insist on the most material-intensive pathways for de-
carbonization.
Declining Ore Grades
An additional matter of concern is declining ore grades and their impact on mining’s 
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pecuniary and environmental costs. The IEA and other data show that average ore grades 
declined significantly over the period, raising the energy intensity measured in gigajoules 
（GJ） of energy use per Mt of copper. A similar trend is event in other materials. 
Declining ore grades in such critical minerals as copper and nickel leads to higher tail-
ing and waste rock for a unit volume of ore extraction. The volumes of material are im-
mense, as is their impact on communities. One paper prepared for the 2020 Global Tailings 
Review reported that waste rock volumes in 201６ totaled 72 billion tonnes and mine tailings 
8.85 billion tonnes. Contrast those numbers with the fact that the projected 2021/22 total 
global production of cereal grains is 2.287 billion tonnes.25） In addition, the footprint of copper 
mining is startling, as it represents 10.8 billion tonnes of waste rock and 4.1 billion tonnes of 
mine tailings. The latter figure is 4６% of the global total of mine tailings, which include signif-
icant quantities of heavy metals and other health hazards.2６）
An additional matter of grave concern is that many critical minerals – particularly 
copper and lithium – are mined in South America and other areas with high water stress. 
Climate impacts are generally worsening water stress in these areas, as was highlighted in 
the August 7 , 2021 report of the IPCC report on Climate Change 2021.27） But mining the 
minerals requires large volumes of water that it often pollutes, rendering it unfit for human 
consumption and agriculture. In consequence, increased mining risks exacerbating water 
stress in the absence of robust and perhaps costly countermeasures such as water recycling 
and desalinization.
Recycling and Substitution
Most work on energy transitions looks to recycling in “circular economy” strategies as 
one key means to reduce the need for new mining of copper, cobalt, rare earths and other 
metals and minerals. Substitution strategies complement this approach, by seeking new ma-
terials to replace the role of supply-constrained minerals used in batteries, solar panels, and 
25） See “IGC sees record global grain production in 2021/22 season,” Reuters, March 25, 2021: https://
www.reuters.com/article/grains-igc-idUSL1N2LN1OL
26）See Baker, Elaine, et al, “Mine Tailings Facilities: Overview and Industry Trends,” September, 
2020: https://globaltailingsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Ch-II-Mine-Tailings-Facilities_
Overview-and-Industry-Trends.pdf
27）See p. 33 of “Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis Summary for Policymakers,” Inter-
national Panel on Climate Change, August, 2021 : https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar ６ /wg 1 /down 
loads/report/IPCC_AR ６ _WGI_SPM.pdf
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the like. For example, recycling and substitution are key elements of Japan’s approach, with 
Panasonic’s 2170 lithium-ion batteries for Tesla reducing the share of problematic cobalt 
with increased nickel.
But Critical Minerals does not expect recycling to become a significant source of sup-
ply for at least a couple of decades. Its modeling shows that the 2020 stock of spent batteries 
is negligible, meaning their recycling cannot meet any of the escalating demand for battery 
storage. By 2030, recycled battery materials are at best a source of 1 % of new materials de-
mand, and even as late as 2040, recycling provides only about 8 % of demand. 
These results confirm earlier concerns about over-reliance on the circular economy. 
The IEA’s findings on this point are consistent with other recent empirical work, such as the 
German Fraunhofer Institute’s November 2020 study on “The Promise and Limits of Urban 
Mining.” 28） Another example is the December 10 , 2020 survey from the Hague Centre for 
Strategic Studies （HCSS）．The HCSS released a very detailed, book-length report on 
“Securing Critical Materials for Critical Sectors: Policy options for the Netherlands and the 
European Union,” which examined the critical mineral implications of the Dutch and EU com-
mitments to decarbonization. Their broad-based analysis included critical mineral demand 
for renewable energy （wind, solar, geothermal），energy grid infrastructure, carbon-capture 
and storage, electric vehicles, and semiconductors. The HCSS warned that recycling and oth-
er “circular economy” policies would quite inadequate to address the massive increase in re-
quired critical minerals volumes implied by decarbonization. They pointed out one cannot 
simply recycle critical minerals that are being dug up and processed for use in a massive 
rollout of energy, EVs, and other systems that will be in use for one or a few decades.
To be sure, Critical Minerals does not deny the importance of recycling and substitu-
tion. In fact, the report emphasizes recycling and substitution’s importance in a broad strate-
gy of investment, innovation, recycling, supply chain resilience and sustainability standards. 
The report suggests that there is significant room to raise end-of-life recycling rates for ma-
ny critical minerals. At the same time, achieving these increased rates confronts constraints 
due to the role of amalgams, which make critical minerals difficult to separate.
The IEA analysis confounds hopes that Society 5.0 digitalization and decarbonization 
can avoid hard choices by simply fostering the circular economy and harvesting the “urban 
28）See some of the data in Luis Tercero Espinoza, et al., “The promise and limits of Urban Mining: 
Potentials, Trade-Offs and Supporting Factors for the Recovery of Raw Materials from the Anthro-
posphere,” Fraunhofer ISI, November, 2020 : https://www.isi.fraunhofer.de/content/dam/isi/doku 
mente/ccn/2020/Fraunhofer_ISI_Urban_Mining.pdf
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mine” of discarded smart phones, appliances, and conventional cars. To take a recent exam-
ple, Japan recycled about 80,000 tons of mobile phones and other e-waste to get about 2  
tons of copper for Olympic medals.29） But in energy-transition terms, that nationwide project 
secured only 1/4 of the 8  tons of copper needed for a single MW of offshore wind capacity. 
To reiterate, the IEA data show that the global community is only beginning to build 
a stock of energy-transition infrastructure, including long-distance networks, distributed 
grids, battery storage, electric vehicles, and offshore turbines. Once that huge stock is in 
place and portions of it have reached the end of their useful life, then one can expect sub-
stantial critical mineral flows from recycling. So while we certainly need to adopt much 
stronger policies right now on recycling and substitution, we should not expect them to bear 
ample fruit for decades.
Key Issues with Critical Minerals
The key constraints regarding critical minerals include their relative scarcity, increas-
ing costs, geopolitical risks, and other factors. Figure 3  summarizes some of the key issues 
relating to these factors for batteries, wind power and solar generation. These technologies 
are represented by iconic symbols. As we see, the core critical minerals for each item are in 
the main dominated by China in terms of supply, processing, components and assembly. 
Concerning batteries, for example, China is the source of 32% of raw materials （including co-
balt, lithium, niobium, magnesium, silicon, and others），but that share rises to 52% for pro-
cessed materials in cathodes and anodes. And by the assembly phase, China’s share is ６６%.
Concerning wind power, China dominates raw materials, with a 54% share. This lion’s 
share of the supply chain is maintained throughout processing and components, though as-
sembly of final products is largely （58%） undertaken in the EU.
Solar is even more a China-centred story. It dominates in each category, enjoying 53% 
of raw material through to an astounding 89% of components and 70% of assembly.
Figure 4  exemplifies the critical-mineral debate underway in the US as the President 
Joe Biden Administration seeks to make decarbonization via clean energy a core feature of 
“Build Back Better” from COVD-19. On August 17, 2021, the Biden White House emphasized 
these ambitions in a special release:
29）On this project, see “Tokyo 2020 Medal Project: Towards an Innovative Future for All,” Tokyo 
2020: https://olympics.com/tokyo-2020/en/games/medals-project/
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30）
“Solar will play an important role in reaching President Biden’s 2035 clean electrici-
ty goal – alongside other sources of carbon-pollution free electricity, including onshore and 
offshore wind, existing power plants retrofitted with carbon capture or green hydrogen, 
geothermal, hydropower, and nuclear … To reach a largely decarbonized electricity sector 
by 2035, solar deployment would need to accelerate to three to four times faster than the 
current rate by 2030. Large scale decarbonization of the electricity sector could move solar 
from 3  percent of generation today to over 40 percent by 2035.” 31）
These ambitions imply a massive increase in critical mineral demand, not only be-
cause there is such an emphasis on solar but also because it highlights the very rapid deploy-
30）See Jane Nakano, “The Geopolitics of Critical Minerals Supply Chains,” Presentation to the USEA, 
April 27 , 2021 : https://usea.org/sites/default/files/event-/USEA_April2021_presentation%20
Jane%20Nakano.pdf
31）“FACT SHEET: Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal and Build Back Better Agenda Present Bright 
Future for Solar Power, Good Jobs, and More Affordable Energy,” The White House Briefing Room, 




Figure 3 　 Clean energy technology and critical mineral supply chains
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ment of distributed solar. We have already seen that distributed solar is especially material-
intensive.
Because China dominates supply chains, as seen in figure 3 , the American mining 
community and other advocates are calling for greater domestic mining and processing. The 
evidence they use is the rough quantification of critical material demand for achieving even 
moderate diffusion of batteries, wind, and solar. Using IEA, World Bank, and other reputable 
evidence, the figure highlights that security of supply requires an increase in domestic min-
ing. 32）
We have already seen earlier, however, that US environmentalists tend to downplay 
the critical mineral challenges. The general argument is that recycling and substitution will 
suffice. As a September 3 , 2021 summary of the US public debate describes, “[e]nvironmen-
talists argue the best option is to forgo all mining and gather critical materials instead 
through electronics recycling.” 33） The lack of attention to material issues is such that a 2021 
academic review of 148 peer-reviewed papers on published in English between 2000 and 
2018 revealed a “forward flow supply chain” focus on technologies and deployment rather 
than attention to integrating material constraints.34） Yet the IEA and others have already 
32）“Our Energy Future Depends on Mining,” Minerals Make Life, June 22 , 2021 : https://minerals 
makelife.org/resources/our-energy-future-depends-on-mining/
33）See Alexandra Gillespie, “Your Next Car May Be Built With Ocean Rocks. Scientists Can’t Agree 
If That’s Good,” NPR, September 3 , 2021: https://www.npr.org/2021/09/03/1031434711/your-next-
car-may-be-built-with-ocean-rocks-scientists-cant-agree-if-thats-good
34）Maria A. Franco and Stephan N. Groesser, “A Systematic Literature Review of the Solar Photo-
voltaic Value Chain for a Circular Economy,” Sustainability, 2021, 13（17），August 2６, 2021: https://
Source: Minerals Make Life, 202132）
Figure 4 　 Mining and critical minerals
Global investments in advanced energy will increase 3x by 2030
reaching $4 trillion annually. To be a world leader in energy
technologies, the U.S. must increase domestic mining and secure its
supply chains for the estimated 3 billion tons of minerals and metals
needed to deploy wind, solar and other advanced energy technologies.
Advanced energy technologies are set to become the fastest－
growing segment of demand for most minerals.
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shown that even aggressive recycling will supply only a few percent of demand in a decade 
or two. That denial of empirical fact is one reason the US mining community has produced 
these data-rich materials. In figure 5 , they drill down on the precise quantities of critical 
minerals used in wind turbines and solar panels. They are not in the least opposed to renew-
able energy, but rather seek to show the material implications of a dramatically accelerated 
rollout. The many multiples of possibly increase demand for manganese, chromium, copper, 
and other minerals of course assumes that chemistries will not dramatically change. But that 
assumption seems realistic in light of advocates’ emphasis that energy transition can be 
achieved with already existing technologies. 35）
Figure 6  too builds on World Bank, IEA and other studies concerning the transport 
sector’s demand for critical minerals. The data confirm the IEA Critical Minerals report and 
myriad other studies that have emerged in 2021. As with the material impacts of renewable 
generation technologies, increases in electric vehicle diffusion from 3  million in 2020 to 70 
million in 2040 would result in many multiples of lithium, cobalt and other material demand 
www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/17/9６15
35）“Our Energy Future Depends on Mining,” Minerals Make Life, June 22 , 2021 : https://minerals 
makelife.org/resources/our-energy-future-depends-on-mining/
Source: Minerals Make Life, 202135）
Figure 5 　 Wind and solar energy material demand
The World Bank expects global wind capacity to increase
3x and solar capacity to increase 5x by 2050.
In the past decade alone, wind power capacity has already increased 4x.
A single 3 megawatt turbine requires:
Solar capacity has increased by almost 20x over the past decade.
・335 tons of steel
・4.7 tons of copper
　－ Offshore wind could account for
 nearly 40% of copper demand1
・3 tons of aluminum
・2 tons of rare earths
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Figure 7  highlights the US mining community’s argument that the country has ample 
reserves of critical minerals, worth an estimate USD ６.2 trillion. They lobby for reforms to 
tax and regulatory regimes, so as to build a domestic industry that can reduce extreme reli-
36）“Our Energy Future Depends on Mining,” Minerals Make Life, June 22 , 2021 : https://minerals 
makelife.org/resources/our-energy-future-depends-on-mining/
37）“Our Energy Future Depends on Mining,” Minerals Make Life, June 22 , 2021 : https://minerals 
makelife.org/resources/our-energy-future-depends-on-mining/
Source: Minerals Make Life, 20213６）
Figure 6 　 Critical minerals in transport
Depending on climate action and available
technologies, growth in demand for EV battery
minerals like lithium, cobalt, graphite and nickel
could skyrocket by 2040 compared to 2020 levels:
By 2040, EV sales could exceed 70 million, cars
compared to only 3 million in 2020, causing
mineral demands to increase 40x current levels.
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To deliver the future of advanced energy, the U.S. needs a strong and stable supply of domestic minerals. U.S. mineral
import reliance has doubled over the past decade despite an estimated $6.2 trillion worth of untapped mineral
reserves available on American soil. With commonsense reforms, domestic mining can support the growing need for
minerals while providing high－paying jobs and maintaining strong environmental protections.
In 2020, the U.S. was 100% import－
reliant for 17 key minerals and more
than 50% import－reliant for 29
additional key minerals.
87% of voters believe our material
supply chains should use minerals
sourced from U.S. mines.
Policymakers need to support smart policies to ensure U.S. minerals mining
is ready to supply these essential inputs. Here’s how:
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ance on Chinese critical minerals as well as supply the projected massive increases in de-
mand. They also highlight polling data that suggests 87% of the US public desires stronger 
domestic supply chains.
Figure 8  adds to the argument with a focus on smart city technologies and their criti-
cal mineral requirements. These data are generally not addressed in studies that centre on 
renewable energy, electric vehicles, and stationary batteries. But the evidence increasingly 
suggests that 5G, data centres, semi-conductors, and other advanced “smart” technologies re-
quire prodigious quantities of critical minerals. For example, the “fabrication of high-speed, 
high-capacity integrated circuits required only 12 minerals in the 1980s but more than ６0 by 
the 2000s. Building a modern cell phone now requires materials containing 75 minerals, com-
prising elements covering about two thirds of the periodic table.” 38）
Is This All Hype?
Even efforts to explore exaggerations in the critical mineral argument run into hur-
dles. In July of 2021 , Wood MacKenzie sought to apprehend the degree of hype in critical 
mineral “supercycle” debates. Their data – reproduced in figure 9 – show that business as 
38）“Our Energy Future Depends on Mining,” Minerals Make Life, June 22 , 2021 : https://minerals 
makelife.org/resources/our-energy-future-depends-on-mining/
Future energy transitions require a significant
expansion of electricity grids or refurbishing
existing grids to strengthen their resiliency and
to improve digitalization, for smart and flexible
grids:
・ 2x the copper and aluminum by 2040 for wires and cables.
5G technology is the fastest growing mobile
technology and is expected to unleash a massive
ecosystem that would allow networks to serve
billions of connected devices:
・ 5G requires gallium for semiconductors, silver
   to enable its networks, and copper to build base stations




・ Nickel combined with
   stainless steel to
   provide cost－effective architecture
・ Limestone to make insulated
   concrete for efficient temperature
   control
・ Copper to improve conductivity
   and reduce energy consumption
・ Quartz in windows to improve
   energy－efficiency
・ Gold in solar panels to increase
   photovoltaic efficiency
From energy－efficient buildings and homes to power grids and digital
technology, smart cities are made possible by minerals.
SMART CITIES
5G
Source: Minerals Make Life, 202138）
Figure 8 　 Smart cities and mining
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usual has only moderate implications for aluminum and other commodities over the decade 
to 2030. But efforts to pursue a 2ºC warming scenario clearly imply large expansions of de-
mand. The figure shows that Wood MacKenzie forecast significantly increased demand for 
critical minerals. 39）
Figure 10 portrays the Wood MacKenzie outlook for carbon dioxide reductions out to 
2050. Their data show the profound pace of cuts required to reach an Accelerated Energy 
Transition （AET） that keeps projected warming to 2ºC or even. The figure shows that the 
deep but temporary global reduction in emissions from COVID-19 pales in comparison to the 
even steeper and permanent cuts required for the AET scenarios.
And how do Wood MacKenzie propose to achieve these cuts? Their AET -1.5 （ie, 
1.5ºC） is predicated on a USD 50 trillion investment “over the next three decades to electrify 
infrastructure and engineer out the aspects of modern life that most significantly contribute 
to carbon emissions.” The core technologies of decarbonization are depicted in their data re-
produced in figure 11. They calculate the weight, in kilograms per unit or per kilowatt （Kw），
for critical minerals used in electric vehicles and charging stations, solar and offshore wind. 
Their data are roughly consistent with the IEA and other data seen earlier, meaning poten-
tially a huge global increase in demand if decarbonization via these technologies is general-
ized.
Wood MacKenzie also stress – as shown in figure 12 - that China’s role in critical min-
erals grew from 2000 to 2020 because of the intersection of its own growth and dependence 
on external supplies. Their assumption is that Chinese dominance will not readily yield, as it 
39）“Champagne supercycle: taking the fizz out of the commodity boom,” Wood Mackenzie, July 2021: 
https://www.woodmac.com/horizons/champagne-supercycle-taking-the-fizz-out-of-the-commodi 
ty-boom/
= 2030 base supply = replacement supply needed, 3˚C scenario = additional supply needed, 2˚C scenario






Source: Wood Mackenzie, 202139）
Figure 9 　 The Wood MacKenzie material demand projections
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is deepening its downstream control over critical minerals. They add that “[w]ith China domi-
nant in its control of energy transition value chains, non-Chinese entities face an ever-dimin-
ishing share of any commodity windfall. With greater cash comes greater investment capa-
bility, enabling China to realise a strategy of supply security at any cost.” 40） 41）
But then the Wood MacKenzie report veers off into speculation about “emerging tech-
nologies – such as next-generation electrofuels, polymeric energy storage and low/zero nick-
40）“Champagne supercycle: taking the fizz out of the commodity boom,” Wood Mackenzie, July 2021: 
https://www.woodmac.com/horizons/champagne-supercycle-taking-the-fizz-out-of-the-commodi 
ty-boom/
41）“Champagne supercycle: taking the fizz out of the commodity boom,” Wood Mackenzie, July 2021: 
https://www.woodmac.com/horizons/champagne-supercycle-taking-the-fizz-out-of-the-commodi 
ty-boom/
Source: Wood Mackenzie, 202140）
Figure 10　 The Wood MacKenzie AET scenarios
Source: Wood Mackenzie, 202141）















AI = Aluminium; Co = Cobalt; Cu = Copper, LCE = Lithium; Ni = Nickel; Zn = Zinc
 AI 236kg/ unit
 Cu 140kg/ unit
 LCE 36kg/ unit
 Ni 13kg/ unit
 Co 5kg/ unit
 AI 22kg/ Kw
 Zn 5kg/ Kw
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 Cu 8kg/ Kw
 AI 3kg/ Kw
 Zn 0.7kg/ Kw
EVs + Charging Photovoltaic Offshore
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el- and cobalt-free, high-energy-density batteries – that could dramatically alter the clean-
energy landscape.” They suggest that these technological changes “may push those metals 
expecting to benefit from the impending supercycle into obscurity.” Yet as the IEA and myr-
iad other studies have shown, the trajectory over the past few decades has been a deepening 
of critical-mineral demand in transport, energy, smart technology, and other areas. That fact 
suggests the Wood MacKenzie report is unreasonably optimistic. 42）
Mining for the Distributed Future
Indeed, as we have already seen earlier, most scenarios of energy transition rely on 
the most material-intensive distributed paradigm. We see this in figure 13, which presents 
one recent summary of the shift from centralized to distributed energy systems. The enor-
mous appeal of the distributed paradigm is that it provides local communities and consumers 
with a direct role in energy generation, transmission, storage and management. In an world 
marked by increasing income inequality and political polarization, this democratizing aspect 
is certainly laudable. But democratic ideals do not trump geological realities and other facts 
of ongoing energy transitions.
Indeed, the diversity of energy transitions is beginning to become a core theme of ad-
vanced work. We see this is in “New Energy Outlook, 2021 ,” by Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance （BNEF），whose idealized types are separated into green, grey and red scenarios as 
seen in figure 14. Bloomberg New Energy Finance is one of the world’s most respected orga-
nizations for work on energy and climate. Their work hitherto has been marked by at best a 
42）“Champagne supercycle: taking the fizz out of the commodity boom,” Wood Mackenzie, July 2021: 
https://www.woodmac.com/horizons/champagne-supercycle-taking-the-fizz-out-of-the-commodi 
ty-boom/
China Canada UK US Japan Australia RoW
AI Ni Co Cu
2000
2020
Source: Wood Mackenzie, 202142）
Figure 12　 China’s critical mineral control in comparison, 2000-2020
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grudging acceptance of nuclear energy, in contrast to a marked enthusiasm for solar and 
wind. Yet their awareness of the scale of climate and critical mineral challenges, coupled 
with stubborn facts on the ground, has driven them to develop diverse scenarios. Notably, 
the red scenario includes a massive commitment to nuclear energy． 43）
Figure 15 affords more detail on the BNEF approach, which the organization plans to 
apply on a country-level basis from 2021. They acknowledge that these are idealized scenari-
43）Philip Emmerich, “How smart grid technologies are disrupting the energy sector,” Energy Tran-
sition, July 22 , 2021 : https://energytransition.org/2021/07/how-smart-grid-technologies-are-dis 
rupting-the-energy-sector/
STAYING BIG OR GETTING SMALLER






based on large power lines and pipelines
centralized, mostly national
few large power plants
passive, only paying
both directions
including small－scale transmission and regional
supply compensation
decentralized, ignoring boundaries
many small power producers



























Figure 13　 Centralized versus distributed power systems
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os, and almost certainly will not be evident in any particular country’s actual 2050 power 
mix. What is important is that they recognize that decarbonization is almost certainly going 
to involve a diverse portfolio of technologies. 44） 45）
The explicit recognition that nuclear power is likely to play a larger role than many 
44）“New Energy Outlook, 2021,” Bloomberg New Energy Finance, July 2021: https://about.bnef.com/
new-energy-outlook/
45）“New Energy Outlook, 2021,” Bloomberg New Energy Finance, July 2021: https://about.bnef.com/
new-energy-outlook/





















Figure 14　 The green, red and gray scenarios
BNEF, 202145）
Figure 15　 Electricity generation in the green, red, and gray scenarios
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believe is, ironically, demonstrated by China. Though the US at present remains the world’s 
largest nuclear producer, with half of its low-carbon power being generated by nuclear, 
China is rapidly gaining ground. Indeed, Wood Mackenzie Asia Pacific Head of Markets and 
Transitions, Prakash Sharma made it clear that “[b]y 2050, the country （China） will account 
for nearly half of global operational nuclear capacity which is expected to rise 88% from 2020 
to hit ６85GW under a 2 -degree Celsius scenario.” This assertion belies many concerns that 
nuclear is unsafe, expensive, and has no waste disposal. In point of fact, “an increasing num-
ber of stakeholders and institutions have reiterated nuclear as a safe, friendly and green en-
ergy resource for the environment.” Because of that, Wood Mackenzie’s position is that “small 
modular nuclear reactors could play a crucial role in meeting Paris Agreement targets.” 4６）
Indeed, even Canada’s Green Party membership is split on the role of nuclear. A poli-
cy vote held during the summer of 2021 determined that 39.６% of party members opted to 
maintain federal government funding for nuclear energy research whereas 37.3% voted to 
end it and 23% opted not to take a position.47）
The diversity of the BNEF scenarios is also seen in figure 16, which depicts the vol-
umes of hydrogen used in decarbonization. The green scenario clearly relies on it extensive-
ly, to balance power systems and otherwise serve as an input in myriad processes. The grey 
scenario relies on very small amounts, because it is fossil-fuel intensive. The red scenario dif-
fers from its green counterpart in requiring almost no hydrogen in power. That aspect im-
plies a lower critical mineral footprint, as producing green hydrogen requires massive invest-
ments in renewable capacity coupled with a lot of catalysts.
The realism of the red strategy is in part reflected in figure 17. This data is also from 
BNEF, but focused on demand for battery metals. The BNEF assessment tells us that be-
tween 2021 and 2030 （a short period in which little substitution can be expected） copper de-
mand in batteries is likely to rise by 550%, aluminum by 570%, and so on. That demand 
would be directly competing with the demand for critical minerals in solar, wind, and other 
renewable generation. Overall, the critical mineral demand in this sector alone rises from un-
der 2  million metric tonnes in 2020 to just below 14 million metric tonnes in 2030. That vol-
46）“China to lead small modular reactor market by 2050 – report,” Power Engineering, August 30, 
2021 : https://www.powerengineeringint.com/nuclear/china-to-lead-small-modular-reactor-mar 
ket-by-2050-report/
47）Jacques Poitras, “Greens divided over taxpayer funding for small nuclear reactors,” CBC News, 
August 24 , 2021 : https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/new-brunswick/green-party-nuclear-
vote-1.６150577
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ume of minerals also implies prodigious quantities of energy, water and other inputs. 48） 49）
48）“New Energy Outlook, 2021,” Bloomberg New Energy Finance, July 2021: https://about.bnef.com/
new-energy-outlook/
49）“BloombergNEF: battery metals rebounding; by 2030 , annual Li-ion battery demand to pass 
2 TWh,” Green Car Congress, July 1 , 2021: https://www.greencarcongress.com/2021/07/20210701-
bnef.html
BNEF, 202148）
Figure 16　 Hydrogen in the green, red and gray scenarios
Green Car Congress, 202149）
Figure 17　 Critical mineral demand in batteries






















































Source: BloombergNEF. Note: Metals demand occurs at mine mouth, one－year before battery demand. All metals expressed in
metric tons of contained metal, except lithium, which is in lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE).
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Figure 18 summarizes BNEF’s vision of changes in final energy from 2019 to the 2050 
scenarios. We see that electrification rises from 19% to 49% in all the scenarios, almost en-
tirely displacing the role of oil. Even the gray scenario includes only 29% fossil fuels. 50） 51）
Interestingly, the BNEF data in figure 19 suggest that the red scenario may provide 
more primary energy. The extra primary energy supplied by nuclear power is often seen as 
anathema to observers who emphasize the need for conservation. On the other hand, it could 
50）“New Energy Outlook, 2021,” Bloomberg New Energy Finance, July 2021: https://about.bnef.com/
new-energy-outlook/
51）“New Energy Outlook, 2021,” Bloomberg New Energy Finance, July 2021: https://about.bnef.com/
new-energy-outlook/
BNEF, 202150）
Figure 18　 Total final energy, 2019 and 2050
BNEF, 202151）
Figure 19　 Total primary energy, by scenario
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be valuable for powering increasing developing-country demand for cooling, refrigeration 
and other essential and energy-intensive counter-measures to accelerating climate change. 52）
What About Mining Investment?
Were critical mineral supplies not at issue, then realizing scenarios would be largely 
political choices. But as we see in subsequent data, supplies are likely to be squeezed due to 
under-investment in mining. The data in figure 20 thus show the 199６-2020 aggregate in-
vestment in non-ferrous metal exploration versus indexed prices for metals. We see that re-
cent years reveal a seriously delayed investment response to increased materials prices. This 
is in large measure a consequence of very high investment in the early 2010s in anticipation 
of a sustained secular rise in prices. But metal prices dropped between 2012 and 2015, under-
mining the economics of a lot of project investment. In consequence, mining firms have be-



































































Aggregate nonferrous exploration budget
Data as of Sept. 25, 2020.












































Annual nonferrous exploration budgets, 1996－2020
S&P Global, 202052）
Figure 20　 Annual nonferrous exploration budgets, 1996‐2020
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come rather risk-averse.
Figure 21 affords a further insight into the impact of changing incentives. We see that 
the price uncertainty saw small-scale producers pull back most. 53）
The pullback depicted in figure 21 is further contextualized in figure 22 . This data 
show that investments were increasingly focused on minesite and late-stage projects. This 
flight to presumed safety is understandable but also means that higher ore-grades are sacri-
ficed. Late-stage projects are, by definition, projects in their declining phase, so increased ore 
grades are not likely. Greenfield investments are where the higher ore-grades and more new 
supply can be expected, but higher risks have disincentivized that. 
Figure 23 provides a summary of what this means for copper, often referred to as “the 
new oil” of the energy transition. We see that the dramatic decline in exploration budgets 
has led to a declining trend in serves and resources. There is certainly a lot of copper re-


















































Major Intermediate Junior Gov’t/Other
Data as of Sept. 25, 2020.














Majors continue to drive exploration
S&P Global, 202053）
Figure 21　 Project investor scale, 2003‐2020
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maining to be found, as the data on projected new discoveries indicates. But that potential is 
not being actualized, even as demand for copper is set to balloon in energy, transport, and 
other areas. 54）
Of additional concern is that Latin America still represents roughly 40% of global cop-
per supply. To be sure, there are significant discoveries being made in other regions, as we 
see in figure 24. But turning those discoveries into actual output of refined metal takes a de-
cade or two of preparations, including assessing environmental impacts, building infrastruc-
ture, training and recruiting workers, constructing refining capacity, and other items.
On this, it is instructive to pay heed to observations by geopolitical analyst Jacob 
Shapiro. His analysis highlights some of the myriad issues concerning the regional concentra-
tion and declining ore grades of copper:































































Data as of Sept. 25, 2020.









Grassroots share of global budgets at all－time low
S&P Global, 202054）
Figure 22　 Grassroots share of project investment, 1997‐2020
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“Even though copper production is 30 percent greater today than a decade ago, pro-
duction at many of the world’s largest copper mines has decreased considerably. In Chile, 
which accounted for 30 percent copper ore exports last year, the average grades of con-
centrate have decreased by 30 percent. （Yes, that’s a lot of 30s – a coincidence, not a ty-
po!） According to the IEA, the copper continent in Chilean ore is now just 0.7 percent. In 
practical terms, that means mining copper is getting costlier, which will also increase pric-
es.  55）
This is not just a Chilean problem – ore grades at major copper mines in Australia, 
Canada, the U.S., and Peru have also declined. Growth in production will have to come 
from places like Peru （where new President Pedro Castillo has threatened to nationalize 
mining interests），the Democratic Republic of Congo （a geopolitical nightmare） and 





















































































Copper in reserves, resources & past production
Projected new copper in major discoveries
Copper exploration budgets
Data as of April  22, 2021.































2017 becomes most prolific discovery year since 2015
S&P Global, 202155）
Figure 23　 Copper investment and discoveries, 1990‐2020
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 5６）
Indonesia. There may be enough copper in the world but it is getting harder and costlier 
to reach.” 57）
Schapiro’s concerns appear to be quite warranted. Both Chile and Peru have been 
deeply affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, in fiscal and political terms. On top of that, the 
clearly increasing value of copper – coupled with its environmental impact – is driving a fo-
cus on making it more ESG-compliant in addition to maximizing its value domestically. 
In Chile, for example, “[h]ardship wrought by the pandemic, coupled with social pro-
tests over inequality, has also prompted an ideological shift in the country, with a specially-
56）“Recent copper discoveries fail to alter downward trend,” S&P Global, May 18 , 2021 : https://
www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/research/recent-discoveries-fail-to-alter-
downward-trend
57）Jacob Shapiro, “Copper: The Red Metal of the Future or Runt of the Portfolio?,” Catalyst Insights, 

















Data as of April  22, 2021.
Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence
Latin America remains top region for
discoveries since 2011
S&P Global, 20215６）
Figure 24　 Latin American and copper discoveries since 2011
Critical Minerals and the Digital Decarbonization Challenge 41
elected body drafting a new constitution to cover thorny issues such as water and property 
rights largely made up of leftist delegates. Chile’s Congress, dominated by a left-leaning op-
position, is also weighing legislation that would impose greater royalty taxes on mining com-
panies and strengthen protection of glaciers, which abut some major mines.” 58） In addition to 
that, the Chilean government indicates that doubling ESG-compliant copper output by 2050 – 
to 9  million tonnes – would require cumulative investment of USD 150 billion.59） 
These trends towards cleaner critical mineral production are positive developments 
for the health and well-being of the local communities in areas where critical minerals are 
mined. But they do raise the costs of producing the minerals, and thus of achieving material-
intensive pathways to digitalization and decarbonization.
The Supply and Price Shocks of 2021
We have seen that projecting the supply of and demand for critical minerals confronts 
myriad issues. On the supply side, it is impossible to assess how much copper, nickel, rare 
earths, tin, silicon and other materials will be available in the short run, let alone over longer 
time frames. This supply uncertainty has many causes, including depressed investment in 
mining and processing, the impacts of the COVID pandemic, political shifts in producer coun-
tries, and a broad range of other uncertainties. At the same time, forecasting demand in-
creases is equally difficult. There are about three dozen critical minerals and hundreds of ar-
eas where they are used, in addition to the renewable energy and electric vehicles that draw 
most attention. Even within renewables and electric mobility, no expert agency can accu-
rately predict the short-run volume of investment in material-intensive wind and solar, pow-
er networks, and electric vehicles, let alone the battery chemistries and other parameters 
that determine material demand.
As we have seen earlier, the currently best-available evidence is a variety of calcula-
tions of the energy and other transformations required to decarbonize over the coming de-
cades. And these assessments are quite fluid. Up to 2020, most analyses assumed that ever-
58）Fabian Cambero, “Chile outlines plans for mining to increase traceability, use less water,” Reuters 
News, September 1 , 2021: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/chile-outlines-plans-mining-
increase-traceability-use-less-water-2021-08-31/
59）Fabian Cambero, “Chile needs $150 bln to boost green copper output, minister says,” Reuters 
News, September 2 , 2021 : https://jp.reuters.com/article/chile-mining/exclusive-chile-needs-
150-bln-to-boost-green-copper-output-minister-says-idUSL1N2Q324K
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cheapening renewable energy would rapidly drive coal, nuclear, and other generation out of 
power mixes. It was also believed that massive overbuild of wind and solar generation would 
allow for the production of “green hydrogen” and other alternatives to natural gas and other 
fuels. But in 2021, as we have seen, Bloomberg New Energy Finance reassessed its outlooks 
to include gray and red scenarios towards decarbonization. 
For our purposes here, this diversification of decarbonization assessments should also 
be seen as an admission that material demand is a guess. We also saw that Wood Mackenzie 
expects significant advances in technology to change the material demand profiles of renew-
able generation, electric mobility, and so on. Yet the IEA’s work suggests that significant 
short-run changes in battery chemistries and power-plant designs are not likely. And over 
longer time frames, technological advances are unlikely to alter the one key fact of the past 
two decades: critical mineral density is increasing across the broad frontier of infrastructure 
investment in advanced power, water, communications, health care, mobility, and other core 
systems in developed and developing countries.
We also see in 2021 that these uncertainties cannot be set asides as issues for the fu-
ture. Rather, material prices have become an immediate problem in addition to a mid- and 
long-term challenge. They are already driving up solar and other renewable energy, electric 
vehicle, and electric network costs.
One indicator is price spikes. The September 14 Asia Nikkei summarized the year-on-
year critical mineral price increases and those materials’ multiple areas of use. Their data in-
dicated that lithium carbonate prices had increased a startling 150%, while tin was up 81.8%, 
aluminum up 55.4%, cobalt up 51.5% and copper up by 37.3%.６0）
Tin may seem an unimportant material, and it certainly does not get the attention ac-
corded to cobalt and rare earths. However, it is the “glue” of the smart and clean transforma-
tion from carbon-intensive and low tech industries. As a September 1６ article in Mining 
News put it, “[a] 2018 Rio Tinto-commissioned study carried out at MIT [Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology] found that tin beat out more likely technology metal candidates like 
lithium, cobalt, and graphite it when comes to being impacted by new technologies such as 
autonomous and electric vehicles, advanced robotics, renewable energy, and computers.” ６1）
60）“Tech industry braces for skyrocketing rare earth prices,” Asia Nikkei, September 14 , 2021 : 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Technology/Tech-industry-braces-for-skyrocketing-rare-earth-
prices
61）Shane Lasley, “Tin has been critical for 5,500 years,” Mining News, September 1６, 2021: https://
www.miningnewsnorth.com/story/2021/09/1６/critical-minerals-alliances/tin-has-been-critical-
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Aluminum is also often taken for granted in discussions of critical minerals. Indeed, it 
is often depicted as a ready substitute for copper in electrical networks, air conditioning, and 
other copper-intensive applications. But aluminum’s price was already up more than copper, 
limiting the capacity to substitute. And by the 22nd of September, 2021, the Asia Nikkei was 
warning that aluminum prices were up ６0%. It also highlighted the uncomfortable fact that 
６0% of aluminum is smelted in China, producing 4 % of Chinese emissions, but that alumi-
num is crucial to decarbonization. Most of China’s low-emission hydropower for producing 
aluminum is situated in Yunnan Province, whose dams provide 70% of local power. But these 
power assets were already locked up by aluminum in addition to other heavy power users 
such as silicon and magnesium.６2） With China seeking to reduce the environmental impact of 
its own mining and processing, particularly in advance of the February 2022 Winter 
Olympics, cheap and clean power was emerging as a bottleneck for aluminum and other ma-
terials.
Even more surprising was the spike in prices for silicon metal used in a variety of ap-
plications. By the end of September 2021, the price of solar-grade polysilicon had surged by 
over 300% as compared to June 2020. Bloomberg News emphasized that the price spike was 
being driven by a complex of cyclical and structural factors:
“Silicon, which makes up 28% of the earth’s crust by weight, is one of mankind’s 
most diverse building blocks. It’s used in everything from computer chips and concrete, to 
glass and car parts. It can be purified into the ultra-conductive material that helps convert 
sunlight into electricity in solar panels. And it’s the raw material for silicone — a water- 
and heat-resistant compound used widely in medical implants, caulk, deodorants, oven 
mitts and more.
Despite its natural abundance in crude forms such as sand and clay, there have 
been warnings in recent years that surging industrial demand risks creating improbable 
shortages for raw materials like gravel. Now, with China curbing production of high-purity 
silicon metal, the unlikely fragility of the silicon supply chain is being exposed to an alarm-
ing degree.
The knock-on consequences are also particularly alarming for automakers, where 
for-5500-years/６988.html




silicon is alloyed with aluminum to make engine blocks and other parts. Along with silicon, 
they’re also facing a surge in magnesium, another alloying ingredient that’s faced produc-
tion issues during China’s power crunch.” ６3）
Startling as it is, the spike in the silicon price only highlighted the potential for other 
surprises. The constraints on silicon processing appeared likely to be dealt with by the fall of 
2022, relieving price pressures from that aspect. But the lessons of 2021 would appear to be 
that costs can be driven up by unforeseen factors, ranging from natural disaster through to 
escalating fossil-fuel prices.
Moreover, even if silicon supply constraints are addressed by expanded factory capac-
ity, it seems unlikely that most other critical minerals can be dealt with so readily. Hence 
Bloomberg News warned that the energy transition posed the urgent question of “whether 
miners, financiers and governments can mobilize enough capital fast enough to bring on new 
supplies in line with demand.” Bloomberg cited analysts who suggested that “raw materials 
and the companies that produce them should offer higher returns - though also more risk - 
than component manufacturers, equipment makers or electric car producers.” Yet this was 
not happening. The latter fact is due to mining firms’ wariness of ESG pushback and the risk 
that price increases may not last were EV, RE, 5G and other deployment to decline. Added 
to that, material-abundant countries like Peru seek to increase royalties to pay down 
COVID-19 fiscal deficits. These uncertainties in the mining and processing sectors are a 
sharp contrast to the confident and robust scenarios painted by automakers, the solar indus-
try and other producers who take mining for granted.６4）
Ironically, the fossil-fuel price shocks of 2021 emerged as perhaps the key indicator to 
pay closer attention to critical minerals. As of this writing, coal, LNG and other prices were 
increasing at historic rates in Europe and Asia. One reason is that recovery from COVID-19 
economic downturns drove the demand for power well past the capacity of renewable ener-
gy. Indeed, the latter’s output had generally declined due to reduced wind and hydro genera-
tion. In addition, under-investment in upstream and downstream fossil fuel projects meant 
63）Krystal Chia, et al., “Silicon’s 300% surge throws another price shock at the world,” Bloomberg 
News, October 1, 2021: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-10-01/silicon-s-300-surge-
throws-another-price-shock-at-the-world
64）Andrew James, et al, “There’s a Fortune to Be Made in the Obscure Metals Behind Clean Pow-
er,” Bloomberg News, September 21 , 2021 : https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2021-materials-
silver-to-lithium-worth-big-money-in-clean-energy
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global demand exceeded supply. And this was true, even though global growth was still sub-
par due to low international transport and other lagging sectors. As with critical minerals, 
the supply issues were not merely cyclical but also structural. One important piece of evi-
dence was the restricted global capacity to satisfy massive demand for liquefied natural gas 
（LNG）．In 2019, most observers believed that there was over-investment in LNG,６5） which 
like other forms of fossil fuel delivery was dubbed a “stranded asset” and at historic lows. 
Yet by September of 2021, the narrative had changed abruptly as structural problems sud-
denly emerged. As the October 2 , 2021 edition of the online Business and Industry 
Connection（“BIC”）magazine put it, prices had surged from historic lows to historic highs 
in a mere 19 months, but there was little prospect of a short-term reversal:
“Most major LNG producers are operating at or close to full capacity and have allo-
cated the vast majority of their shipments to specific customers, leaving little prospect of a 
short-term fix.
According to the International Gas Union, only 8.9 million tonnes per annum（mtpa）
of a total 139.1 mtpa of planned new liquefaction capacity is expected to come online in 
2021.
Some of that additional capacity has been delayed by COVID-19 movement restric-
tions that have stopped or dragged out construction and maintenance work at several key 
sites including in Indonesia and Russia over the past year.
So far this year, 288.1 million tonnes of LNG has loaded for exports globally, just 
7 % growth over the same period last year, Refinitiv data shows.” ６６）
In other words, it took only a relatively low increase in LNG demand from COVID-19 
lows to drive a massive price spike. With little excess capacity slack in the supply chain, and 
only incremental increases planned, the likelihood is that the problem is structural more than 
cyclical. Indeed, LNG is the fuel of choice for China and other countries that aim to reduce 
their massive dependence on coal-fired power while balancing the intermittency of wind and 
solar renewable energy. Most of these countries are still developing and demographically 
65）See Avi Salzman, “There’s a Worldwide Energy Crunch. Here’s How to Play It,” Barrons, October 
1 , 2021: https://www.barrons.com/articles/natural-gas-prices-stocks-51６3310208６
66）“Explainer: What’s behind the wild surges in global LNG prices and the risks ahead,” BIC Maga-
zine, October 2 , 2021 : https://www.bicmagazine.com/industry/natgas-lng/what-is-behind-the-
wild-surges-in-global-lng-prices/
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young, meaning their demand for power is increasing. The intensive fall-off in LNG and oth-
er fossil-fuel demand induced by COVID-19’s economic fallout obscured these patent facts. 
But they appear to have re-emerged with an urgency that cannot be ignored.
These developments are not just a warning of possible mayhem in critical minerals. 
One reason is that the energy required to mine and process critical minerals is largely de-
rived from fossil fuels and will continue to be over at least the next decade. The already-in-
adequate investment in critical minerals also means that the faster we try to substitute re-
newable energy and electrification in the mining and materials processing sectors, the 
greater the pressure on critical mineral supply chains. Considering the imperative of rapid 
decarbonization, the challenges here are clearly without historic precedent.
Coping with the Challenges
We have seen that critical mineral demand is already accelerating and almost certain 
to expand further. Prices of copper, aluminum, cobalt and other critical minerals are already 
increasing to historic levels.６7） The IEA and other work emphasize the urgency of compre-
hensive and inclusive policy, such as broad-based collaborations on recycling, substitution, 
and innovation that helps increase the efficient use of critical minerals. The IEA’s Critical 
Minerals report also underscores the imperative of clear policy goals within decarbonization. 
The reasoning is that clear goals would reduce the risks of critical minerals price volatility 
and other impediments to expanded supply via mining and processing. Yet we have also 
seen that achieving these aims is very difficult. One reason is that there are so many compet-
ing scenarios of decarbonization and digital transformation, such as within Japan. Advocacy 
coalitions seem quite unwilling to make compromises concerning their favoured decarboniza-
tion solutions, and this is reflected in party politics and policymaking. It seems clear that rap-
id decarbonization led by variable renewable energy – especially at the expense of existing 
nuclear capacity – implies unsustainable demand for critical minerals, but that is not yet part 
of the Japanese public debate.
The IEA and other actors also stress the need for a regime of ESG-compliant critical 
minerals, both to protect the environment and human wellbeing as well as to foster new sup-
67）Japanese concerns about this trend are increasing, though there is still a lot of suspicion that 
price increases are driven largely by speculation. On this, see （in Japanese） “Skyrocketing prices 
for Chinese rare metals,” Nikkan Kogyo Shinbun, September 2 , 2021 : https://www.nikkan.co.jp/
articles/view/00６105６7
Critical Minerals and the Digital Decarbonization Challenge 47
ply. 
A further recommendation is much stronger and integrated international governance. 
At present, there is a patchwork of international institutions and initiatives that address vari-
ous aspects of critical mineral mining and processing. But these efforts are poorly coordinat-
ed and often lack adequate transparency. The IEA suggests that its energy security frame-
work could be of service in this regard, by facilitation the collection and dissemination of 
credible data, regularly assessing the vulnerabilities of supply chains, enhancing flows of 
knowledge and sharing of best-practices, and raising ESG-type standards “to ensure a level 
playing field.” ６8）
Japan’s Policy Strengths and Weaknesses
Japan is already doing a few of the items highlighted by the IEA, and in fact receives 
a degree of acknowledgement in the report. Japan’s stockpiling and recycling are also refer-
enced in other reports. This is to be expected, as Japan has long been a leading manufactur-
er of high-tech, critical mineral-intensive goods. Japan has also been assessing its critical 
material vulnerabilities since the early 1980s.
Japan initially undertook stockpiling of 7  key minerals including cobalt. But as we en-
tered the new millenium, with the rise of material-intensive digital and other related smart 
technologies, Japanese policymakers reassessed their approach. Since the mid-2000s Japan 
has undertaken an explicit and increasingly robust strategy for designating critical minerals, 
and addressing supply risks by emphasizing overseas projects, advanced recycling, substitu-
tion and stockpiling. 
In tandem, Japan’s list of critical minerals has increased to a few dozen from the origi-
nal 7 . Japan has also built good clusters of expertise and initiatives in recycling and substi-
tution, linking those with US and other centres of excellence. One example from October 
2011 is the US-Japan-EU Trilateral Workshop on Critical Raw Materials. Also, since 2013 
Japanese specialists have been working with the US Department of Energy’s Ames Institute 
on the “effective use of critical materials.” ６9）
68）See p. 173, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, International Renewable 
Energy Agency, May 2021 : https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean- 
energy-transitions
69）See “Cooperation between the United States and Japan on Effective Use of Critical Materials,” 
NEDO, September 10, 2013: https://www.nedo.go.jp/content/10053６58６.pdf
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Advanced recycling is a major priority for Japanese policymakers. An emerging strat-
egy is to become a hub for recyclable high-value materials domestically and from overseas. 
Japan does have comparatively good initiatives on recycling and substitution. There is also a 
new effort to drill-down on tungsten, cobalt and 3  select rare earths. 
As of March 2020 , Japan instituted a New International Resource Strategy.70） This 
policy covers 34 critical minerals – referred to as “rare metals” - and includes increased and 
fine-tuned goals for stockpiling of emergency reserves and a greater ability for the Japan 
Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation （JOGMEC） to support private-sector mining and 
smelting initiatives. JOGMEC is also empowered to work with foreign firms in exploration 
activities. The country also officially aims at 80% self-sufficiency by 2030 in base metals such 
as copper and nickel （and 100% by 2050），and is aiming to undertake commercial exploita-
tion of its Exclusive Economic Zone seabed critical minerals from 2028.71）
Yet it is questionable that Japan can expect these high levels of self-sufficiency by 
2030 and 2050. There is almost no transparency in how these targets are determined, which 
is quite odd considering that the IEA, BNEF, World Bank and other agencies highlight po-
tentially dramatic increases in demand for critical minerals. Emerging issues in supply – such 
as copper in South America - would also indicate the need for closer and more collaborative 
scrutiny of Japan’s self-sufficiency levels and targets. One new analysis by Chinese geology 
specialists suggests that Japan （along with South Korea and Spain） is one of the critical 
countries of high risk in the global copper material supply chain, and more of this work 
needs to be undertaken.72） The uncertainty concerning which pathway Japan （not to mention 
the rest of the world） will take towards decarbonization suggests that Japan’s self-sufficien-
cy numbers need to be developed according to multiple scenarios.
Japan has made some initial efforts to quantify the enormous scale of its own critical 
mineral challenge. A report to the Ministry of Economy and Industry （METI） deliberation 
committee on energy on February 15, 2021 pointed out that installing just 10GW of offshore 
70）While the strategy per se is in Japanese, a brief outline in English is available at “New Interna-
tional Resource Strategy Formulated,” Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, March 30, 2020: 
https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2020/0330_005.html
71）Japan’s policies are put in a comparative context by Jane Nakano in “The Geopolitics of Critical 
Minerals Supply Chains,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 11 , 2021 : https://
www.csis.org/analysis/geopolitics-critical-minerals-supply-chains
72）See Baqihua Li, et al., “The global copper material trade network and risk evaluation: A industry 
chain perspective,” Resources Policy, Volume 74, December 2021: https://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/abs/pii/S03014207210028６5
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wind - about 3  nuclear reactors’ worth of power generation - by 2030 would require about 
10% of Japan’s 2018 copper consumption and 20% of Japan’s niobum rare earth consump-
tion.73） The METI seems likely to aim for 45 GW of offshore wind by 2040, but that goal re-
quires massive critical mineral demand that will not be met by recycling and substitution. 
And that critical mineral demand is on top of critical mineral requirements for other 
clean energy generation, transmission and storage, electrified mobility, 5G （and post-5G） 
communications, data centres, aerospace and satellites,74） smart military weapons systems, 
and other elements of Japan’s critical material-intensive Society 5.0, decarbonization, smart 
city, and related industrial policy ambitions.
Yet Japanese policymakers and academics have yet to publish figures on the overall 
critical mineral requirements for the country’s Society 5.0 and decarbonization goals. There 
are no comprehensive critical minerals assessments from within Japan, in spite of its lack of 
terrestrial critical mineral endowments. Indeed, the METI calculation of copper and niobium 
requirements for offshore wind is derived from IEA data. But offshore wind systems differ 
greatly in their critical mineral requirements. Japan’s offshore wind may be more material-
intensive than the average. This is because Japan’s offshore wind projects will have to be de-
veloped in greater oceanic depths and distance from the shore and centres of power con-
sumption. That suggests that – compared to the average - Japanese offshore wind could 
require a great deal of material-intensive investment in power transmission, storage and dis-
tribution networks.
Indeed, on May 13, 2021 Japan’s respected Research Institute of Innovative Technology 
for the Earth released a multi-scenario study on energy options. In its 100% renewable ener-
gy scenario, power prices quadrupled by 2050 because intensive deployment of solar and 
wind would require extensive investment in new transmission, battery storage, and back-up 
from fossil-fuel peaker plant.75） Due to these issues, one would expect Japanese specialists to 
73）See （in Japanese） p. 21, The Metal and Mineral Policies Towards Realizing Carbon Neutrality by 
2050 ,” February 15 , 2021 : https://www.meti.go.jp/shingikai/enecho/shigen_nenryo/kogyo/
pdf/007_03_00.pdf
74）Recent studies of satellite technology （which uses a lot of critical minerals） suggests there is an 
ongoing explosion in numbers as civil, military and private agents turn from large assets to distrib-
uted “constellations” of satellites. Moreover, the current stock of about 3,000 active satellites orbit-
ing the planet is expected to multiply dramatically. On theswe issues, see Lauren Napler, “Thou-
sands more satellites will soon orbit Earth – we need better rules to prevent space crashes,” The 
Conversation, January 28 , 2021 : https://theconversation.com/thousands-more-satellites-will-soon-
orbit-earth-we-need-better-rules-to-prevent-space-crashes-154014
75）See （in Japanese） “Scenario analyses of 2050 carbon neutrality （mid-term report），Research In-
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be producing detailed analyses of Japan’s critical mineral requirements. We have already 
seen that this kind of work is ongoing in the EU countries, the US, and elsewhere. But lan-
guage barriers, shortages of skilled people, and a generalized complacency appears to impede 
Japanese academe, government and civil society from engaging with overseas initiatives.
This status quo seems unacceptably dangerous. New critical mineral mining and pro-
cessing infrastructure generally take many years to put in place. So in the short run 
Japanese Society 5.0 and energy policy should perhaps emphasize innovative approaches to 
coping with critical mineral supply and price risks. These options include:
1 ） If possible, Japan should work with new US-Canada-Australia “Earth MRI” （Critical 
Minerals Mapping Initiative），7６） which deploys the most advanced 3 D mapping technologies 
to identify CRM deposits in addition to natural disaster risks, and renewable energy resource 
potential. Japan has developed and diffused a lot of advanced mapping technology through its 
Society 5.0, National Resilience, and other initiatives. Japan could conceivably contribute a lot 
to collaborative and multi-parameter mapping.
2 ） Japan could be working with India on exploring critical minerals （while also mapping di-
saster risks and renewable energy potential），as only 10% of India has been explored and 
both countries need critical minerals. 77） At present, it would appear that both Japan and 
India are instead looking toward Australia as a secure source of supply. Yet neither 
Australia’s endowments nor its extant production capacity seem sufficient to satisfy both 
countries’ demand.
3 ） Japan’s seafloor mining of critical minerals is expected to start in 2028. But Norway ap-
pears to be planning on an earlier start.78） Japan’s initiative could perhaps be accelerated, 
stitute of Innovative Technology for the Earth, report to basic policy subcommittee, May 13, 2021: 
https://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/committee/council/basic_policy_subcommittee/2021/043/043_005 .
pdf
76）See “Critical Cooperation: How Australia, Canada and the United States are Working Together to 
Support Critical Mineral Discovery,” USGS, October 1６, 2020: https://www.usgs.gov/news/critical-
cooperation-how-australia-canada-and-united-states-are-working-together-support
77）The details are at Biplop Chatterjee and Rayesh Chadha, “Non-Fuel Minerals and Mining: En-
hancing Mineral Exploration in India,” Brookings India Discussion Note, April, 2020: https://www.
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Enhancing-Mineral-Exploration-in-India.pdf
78）Nerijus Adomaitis, “Norway eyes sea change in deep dive for metals instead of oil,” Reuters, Janu-
ary 12, 2021: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-norway-deepseamining-insight-idUSKBN29H1YT
Critical Minerals and the Digital Decarbonization Challenge 51
opening up a new source of critical minerals. This could help bolster the credibility of the 
self-sufficiency numbers and targets, in addition to bolserting the national economy from po-
tential price shocks.
4 ） In tandem with the above, Japanese should partner with ongoing collaboration to confirm 
whether deep-sea mining is potentially more ESG-compliant than terrestrial mining.79） This 
work seems imperative, as BMW, Volvo, Google, Samsung and other global firms are already 
pledging not to use critical minerals mined offshore until the environmental risks are “com-
prehensively understood.” 80） In the absence of evidence that deep-sea sources of critical min-
erals are ESG-compliant, Japan invites reputational risk for its firms should they harvest, 
process, and include those materials in their products.
5 ） Japan’s decarbonization goals are curiously uninformed by its significant climate adapta-
tion strategy,81） even though the IPCC and other global agencies highlight the synergies of 
mitigation and adaptation. Japan might consider the critical mineral implications of these 
synergies in its linkage of Society 5.0 and SDGs.
Conclusion
As 2021 unfolded, it became increasing clear that the critical mineral challenge is 
multi-faceted and global. Though Japan has an ambitious Society 5.0 industrial policy and in-
tegrated governance, its inclusiveness has yet to embrace critical minerals. And Japan’s en-
ergy strategy appears to be unduly complacent concerning critical mineral demand scenarios 
and self-sufficiency goals. Japan conspicuously lacks in the think tanks and comprehensive 
public-policy schools seeking to build on the IEA and other work. Japan should remedy this 
knowledge deficit, by assessing its myriad smart city, decarbonization and other targets in 
terms of Japan-specific critical mineral requirements. 
Second, Japan should find options for material-efficiency. There is limited evidence 
79）See Paulika, Daina, et al. “Life cycle climate change impacts of producing battery metals from 
land ores versus deep-sea polymetallic nodules,” Journal of Cleaner Production, December 2020 : 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959６52６20338６71
80）Henry Sanderson, BMW, “Volvo and Google vow to exclude use of ocean-mined metals,” Finan-
cial Times, March 31, 2021: https://www.ft.com/content/e６18a555-2d21-4f33-b６b5-4６5６4197f834
81）On this, see “Japan and Singapore Submit 2020 NDCs,” SDG Knowledge Hub, April 2 , 2020 : 
https://sdg.iisd.org/news/japan-and-singapore-submit-2020-ndcs/
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that this kind of thinking is - for example - animating discussion among the myriad stake-
holders involved in ongoing deliberations on Japan’s strategic energy policy and its Society 
5.0 policies. It is unlikely that we will see sudden substitution, recycling and other silver-bul-
let breakthroughs that dramatically reduce risks. So it would appear that strategic prioritiz-
ing of the use of scarce critical minerals will be necessary. That scoping of trade-offs ought 
to become an arm of policymaking, built on inclusive engagement of domestic and interna-
tional awareness.
As it considers the sobering critical mineral implications of accelerated digitalization 
and decarbonization, Japan may be able to get more traction in these areas. One reason for 
cautious optimism is that because of ageing, depopulation, and other challenges, Japan is get-
ting increasingly good at focusing scarce human, fiscal, material and other resources by ad-
dressing multiple problems simultaneously. We have seen that Japan has a lot of Society 5.0, 
smart city, and other decarbonization industrial policies. The looming crisis in critical miner-
als may work to foster more pragmatic, multi-stakeholder agreement on pathways to decar-
bonization and digital transformation.
